Part I of this book argued that whether or not the fetus is rightly considered a person is central to a moral and legal appraisal of abortion. Part II embarked on a sustained analysis of a number of arguments about fetal personhood and the constitutive properties of a person. This chapter considers what implications, if any, the conclusions in Parts I and II have when it comes to framing a good law of abortion, as well as the question of what a serious commitment to a ‘right’ to abortion would entail. It also examines problems arising from some obvious gaps between the morality of reproductive decision-making and the justifications for legal interference, including the well-rehearsed ‘back-street abortion argument’.
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