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Arguments about AbortionPersonhood, Morality, and Law$
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Kate Greasley

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198766780

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198766780.001.0001

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Regulating Abortion

Regulating Abortion

Chapter:
(p.203) 9 Regulating Abortion
Source:
Arguments about Abortion
Author(s):

Kate Greasley

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198766780.003.0010

Part I of this book argued that whether or not the fetus is rightly considered a person is central to a moral and legal appraisal of abortion. Part II embarked on a sustained analysis of a number of arguments about fetal personhood and the constitutive properties of a person. This chapter considers what implications, if any, the conclusions in Parts I and II have when it comes to framing a good law of abortion, as well as the question of what a serious commitment to a ‘right’ to abortion would entail. It also examines problems arising from some obvious gaps between the morality of reproductive decision-making and the justifications for legal interference, including the well-rehearsed ‘back-street abortion argument’.

Keywords:   abortion regulation, abortion law, right to abortion, morality, back-street abortion

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