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Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 2Moral Responsibility,  Structural Injustice, and Ethics$
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Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198766179

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198766179.001.0001

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Alienation and Responsibility

Alienation and Responsibility

(p.37) 1.2 Alienation and Responsibility
Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 2

Joshua Glasgow

Oxford University Press

This chapter investigates how we can be responsible for actions and attitudes from which we are fully alienated. Such attitudes include the implicit biases that many good-hearted people wholeheartedly disavow but nonetheless seem to harbor. Several theories are examined, including among others the real-self theory proposed by Harry Frankfurt, the views of T. M. Scanlon, and Nomy Arpaly’s account. Extant theories seem unable to accommodate certain compelling intuitions. To accommodate these considered judgments, the variantist thesis advanced in this chapter is that responsibility can shift depending on the content of the action or attitude, and more fundamentally on the harm done in or by the act or attitude in question.

Keywords:   responsibility, implicit bias, Frankfurt, Scanlon, real-self theory, variantism

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