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Normativity and NormsCritical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes$
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Stanley L. Paulson

Print publication date: 1999

Print ISBN-13: 9780198763154

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198763154.001.0001

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Hans Kelsen's Earliest Legal Theory: Critical Constructivism *

Hans Kelsen's Earliest Legal Theory: Critical Constructivism *

(p.23) 2 Hans Kelsen's Earliest Legal Theory: Critical Constructivism*
Normativity and Norms

Stanley L. Paulson

Oxford University Press

This chapter begins with by introducing constructivism and methodological dualism in Sections I and II, respectively. Section III turns to Kelsen's notion of central imputation and its counterpart in 19th-century German legal science, the fictitious legal person. In comparing these doctrines, it takes up aspects of the 19th-century debate on the legal person and Kelsen's reasons for replacing the doctrine of the tradition with his own new doctrine, central imputation. All of these sets the stage for a closer look at the two difficulties: those generated by Kelsen's need to avoid fictions on the one hand, and anthropomorphization on the other. These difficulties are discussed in Sections IV and V, respectively. Section VI puts them into perspective, examining their disposition in the early years of Kelsen's middle, classical phase.

Keywords:   constructivism, methodological dualism, central imputation, legal person

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