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Free Will and Action Explanation – A Non-Causal, Compatibilist Account - Oxford Scholarship Online
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Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal, Compatibilist Account

Scott Sehon

Abstract

Do we have free will and moral responsibility? Is free will compatible with determinism? This book argues that we can make progress on these questions by focusing on an underlying issue: the nature of action explanation. When a person acts, or does something on purpose, we explain the behavior by citing the agent’s reasons. The dominant view in philosophy of mind has been to construe such explanations as a species of causal explanation. Part I of the book proposes and defends a non-causal account of action and agency, according to which reason explanation of human behavior is irreducibly teleo ... More

Keywords: free will, responsibility, action explanation, reasons, teleology, agency, causal theory of action, determinism, compatibilism

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780198758495
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2016 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198758495.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Scott Sehon, author
Bowdoin College, Maine