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Beyond the CrisisThe Governance of Europe's Economic, Political and Legal Transformation$
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Mark Dawson, Henrik Enderlein, and Christian Joerges

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198752868

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198752868.001.0001

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Banking on Union: EU Governance between Risk and Uncertainty

Banking on Union: EU Governance between Risk and Uncertainty

Chapter:
(p.137) 9 Banking on Union: EU Governance between Risk and Uncertainty
Source:
Beyond the Crisis
Author(s):

Michelle Everson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198752868.003.0009

Given that the recognition, driven by the financial and sovereign debt crises, that a revolutionised financial system also poses dangers to futurising growth such that the primary regulatory aim has become the perfection of market utility by means of control of systemic risk, the European Central Bank now sits at the apex of a system of paradoxically permissive interventionism, which, it is postulated, can both maximise capital formation and provide financial stability. This chapter investigates this proposition, detailing first how conflicting goals of capital maximisation and financial probity are seemingly reconciled within a regime of ‘really-responsive’ supervision dedicated to the maintenance of ‘sound European money’. Thereafter, the analysis details the problems found within permissive interventionism, whereby further efforts to square the circle of secure competition within structures of what can be termed ‘democratised technocracy’ create their own hazards, once again placing the future of the European Union in doubt.

Keywords:   sovereign debt crisis, European Central Bank, systemic risk, permissive interventionism, technocracy, European Union, financial probity

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