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Manifest RealityKant's Idealism and his Realism$
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Lucy Allais

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198747130

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747130.001.0001

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Relational Appearances

Relational Appearances

Chapter:
(p.206) (p.207) 9 Relational Appearances
Source:
Manifest Reality
Author(s):

Lucy Allais

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747130.003.0009

This chapter shows how my essential manifestness account enables us to see how Kant can combine a genuine form of mind-dependence with a genuine empirical realism that sees objects as existing outside our minds in space. It compares his position to three contemporary positions: meaning-theoretic anti-realism; anti-realism in philosophy of science, and structural realism. It is argued that Kant’s idealism about appearances can be understood as the rejection of experience-transcendence about spatio-temporal objects. Kant denies that there is any part of spatio-temporal reality which, in principle, could not be presented to us in a possible intuition. Kant also argues that spatio-temporal appearances are essentially relational, and contain nothing absolutely intrinsic or categorical.

Keywords:   anti-realism, structural realism, experience-transcendence, manifestness, mind-dependence, empirical realism, structural realism, relational, categorical, intrinsic

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