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Manifest RealityKant's Idealism and his Realism$
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Lucy Allais

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198747130

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747130.001.0001

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Concepts and Intuitions

Concepts and Intuitions

(p.145) 7 Concepts and Intuitions
Manifest Reality

Lucy Allais

Oxford University Press

This chapter presents an account of Kant’s notion of intuition. It is argued that the singularity of intuitions should be understood as their presenting perceptual particulars, that the immediacy of intuitions should be understood as their giving us acquaintance with or presenting the particulars they represent, and that this is what it means to say that intuitions give us objects. Intuitions give us acquaintance with objects. It is argued that intuitions do not depend on concepts to play their role of presenting us with particulars and that this view is required to make sense of Kant’s conclusions and his argumentative strategy in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and that it is consistent with the Transcendental Deduction of the categories.

Keywords:   intuition, singularity, immediacy, acquaintance, concepts, intuitions, Transcendental Deduction, Transcendental Aesthetic, perceptual particulars

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