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Manifest RealityKant's Idealism and his Realism$
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Lucy Allais

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198747130

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747130.001.0001

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Things in Themselves Without Noumena

Things in Themselves Without Noumena

(p.59) 3 Things in Themselves Without Noumena
Manifest Reality

Lucy Allais

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues against two extreme ways of understanding Kant’s notion of things as they are in themselves. The first extreme, ‘noumenalism’, is the view that he is committed to the existence of supersensible, non-spatio-temporal objects in addition to the objects of our knowledge, noumena in the positive sense. The second, ‘mere empirical realism’, holds that he is committed to the existence only of empirically real, spatio-temporal objects. A number of objections have been presented in the literature to the idea that there can be an identity relation between things in themselves and appearances. It is not necessary to see Kant as committed to problematic object-identity statements in order to see him as committed to the claim that the spatio-temporal objects we experience are appearances of a more fundamental or ultimate aspect of reality which we cannot cognize and which is somehow responsible for the aspect we experience.

Keywords:   things in themselves, noumena, empirical realism, appearances, supersensible

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