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Manifest RealityKant's Idealism and his Realism$
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Lucy Allais

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198747130

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747130.001.0001

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Why Kant is Not a Phenomenalist

Why Kant is Not a Phenomenalist

(p.37) 2 Why Kant is Not a Phenomenalist
Manifest Reality

Lucy Allais

Oxford University Press

This chapter presents seven arguments against understanding Kant’s transcendental idealism about spatio-temporal objects (things as they appear to us) as a phenomenalistic idealism which sees appearances as existing literally in our minds. It is argued that a phenomenalist interpretation is not able to do justice to Kant’s empirical realism, and does not have a good fit with the text. It is argued that the strongest reason not to read Kant in this way is his explicit rejection of what he thinks Berkeley’s and Descartes’ views have in common: in the Refutation of Idealism he says he wants to establish the reality of those very outer objects whose existence (he thinks) Berkeley denies and Descartes renders doubtful.

Keywords:   transcendental idealism, appearances, empirical realism, phenomenalist, Berkeley, Refutation of Idealism

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