This chapter argues that Kant is committed to thinking that things have intrinsic, non-relational, categorical natures which ground their relational appearances. Kant’s discussion about relations requiring something non-relational in the Amphiboly is discussed, and it is argued that this supports attributing to him the idea that things have intrinsic natures. Similarities and differences between my account and that of Rae Langton are discussed. On Kant’s account, not only can we not know things’ intrinsic natures, we cannot understand how they ground appearances, or even what kind of relation this grounding might be. However, it is argued that this does not rule out our being entitled to say that the way things are in themselves grounds appearances, and that we can give an account of some formal features of this relation.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.