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Manifest RealityKant's Idealism and his Realism$
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Lucy Allais

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198747130

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747130.001.0001

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Intrinsic Natures

Intrinsic Natures

(p.231) 10 Intrinsic Natures
Manifest Reality

Lucy Allais

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that Kant is committed to thinking that things have intrinsic, non-relational, categorical natures which ground their relational appearances. Kant’s discussion about relations requiring something non-relational in the Amphiboly is discussed, and it is argued that this supports attributing to him the idea that things have intrinsic natures. Similarities and differences between my account and that of Rae Langton are discussed. On Kant’s account, not only can we not know things’ intrinsic natures, we cannot understand how they ground appearances, or even what kind of relation this grounding might be. However, it is argued that this does not rule out our being entitled to say that the way things are in themselves grounds appearances, and that we can give an account of some formal features of this relation.

Keywords:   Amphiboly, relations, Langton, grounding, things in themselves, intrinsic, non-relational, categorical, appearances, intrinsic natures

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