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Analogies and TheoriesFormal Models of Reasoning$
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Itzhak Gilboa, Larry Samuelson, and David Schmeidler

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198738022

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738022.001.0001

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Dynamics of Inductive Inference in a Unified Framework

Dynamics of Inductive Inference in a Unified Framework

Chapter:
(p.87) 4 Dynamics of Inductive Inference in a Unified Framework
Source:
Analogies and Theories
Author(s):

Itzhak Gilboa

Larry Samuelson

David Schmeidler

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738022.003.0004

This chapter presents a formal model that captures both case‐based and rule‐based reasoning. The model is general enough to describe Bayesian reasoning, which may be viewed as an extreme example of rule‐based reasoning. It suggests conditions under which Bayesian reasoning will give way to other modes of reasoning, and alternative conditions under which the opposite conclusion holds. It discusses how probabilistic reasoning may emerge periodically, with other modes of reasoning used between the regimes of different probabilistic models.

Keywords:   case-based reasoning, rule-based reasoning, Bayesian reasoning, probabilistic models

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