While the aesthetics of argument does not presuppose specific theories of language, truth, or logic, it is hospitable towards accounts of semantics that are sensitive to pragmatics, of truth that respect truth’s interdependence with meaning, and of logic that take seriously logic’s ampliative dimension; its concern with the principled assessment of verbal imagery reinforces these tendencies. Analogy, narrative, image, and symbol can all be used in different ways to frame one domain in terms of another, severally or in various combinations. Such framing can be particularly effective in argumentative roles which invite self-interrogation. Beyond this, the “logic” of imagery enables us to make principled sense of the way we can grasp imagistically elements of our experience through words whose use at the imaginative level has transformed their standard conceptual relationships. In such cases we may find that the modes of argument and imagination are interdependent.
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