Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Nietzschean SelfMoral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Paul Katsafanas

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198737100

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198737100.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 25 February 2020

Willing without a Will

Willing without a Will

(p.135) 6 Willing without a Will
The Nietzschean Self

Paul Katsafanas

Oxford University Press

This chapter analyzes Nietzsche’s account of self-conscious willing. It is often thought that Nietzsche treats conscious choices as causally inert, epiphenomenal, or mere symptoms of underlying processes that elude our attempts at introspection. This chapter shows that this is a mistake: Nietzsche offers a subtle critique of the Kantian account of willing, rejecting in particular the claim that we are capable of suspending the effects of our motivational states. Nonetheless, he agrees with Kant that motives do not determine choice: our motives could be the same, and yet we could choose differently. Moreover, he maintains that conscious choice plays a causal role in the production of action. Although conscious thought does not make punctual, decisive contributions to the production of action, it does intervene in continuous streams of behavior, altering motives and sometimes transforming this behavior in profound ways.

Keywords:   Nietzsche, willing, choice, Kant, motive, action

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .