Chapter 5 shows how Nietzsche uses his drive psychology and conscious/unconscious distinction to develop an account of values. We typically treat values as manifest in the agent’s reflective judgments. To value X is, in part, to make judgments of the form “X is valuable,” to guide one’s practical deliberation with principles such as “X ought to be promoted,” and so forth. Yet Nietzsche seems to deny these claims, focusing on valuations inherent in pre-reflective psychological phenomena: our drives. He frequently claims both that drives include evaluations and that drives explain reflective evaluative judgments. This chapter argues that non-conscious drives explain the agent’s self-conscious judgments concerning what is valuable. In particular, drives structure the agent’s perceptions and generate thoughts about justification, thereby strongly inclining agents to regard pursuit of the drive’s end as valuable.
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