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The Nietzschean SelfMoral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious$
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Paul Katsafanas

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198737100

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198737100.001.0001

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(p.77) 4 Drives
The Nietzschean Self

Paul Katsafanas

Oxford University Press

This chapter analyzes Nietzsche’s most important psychological concept, the drive (Trieb or Instinkt). Drives are non-conscious dispositions that generate affective orientations. They take a two-part complement, having both an aim and an object. The aim is the drive’s characteristic form of activity; the object is adventitious, a chance occasion for expression. Drives dispose the agent not to realize any particular end, but merely to engage in their characteristic form of activity. Accordingly, they are not satisfied by the attainment of their objects. Nietzsche argues that drive-motivation is pervasive—all of our actions, he thinks, are produced by drives. This has a host of important consequences that are explored in the following chapters.

Keywords:   Nietzsche, drive, Trieb, Instinkt, motivation

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