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The Nietzschean SelfMoral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious$
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Paul Katsafanas

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198737100

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198737100.001.0001

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The Unconscious

The Unconscious

(p.14) 2 The Unconscious
The Nietzschean Self

Paul Katsafanas

Oxford University Press

This chapter addresses Nietzsche’s distinction between the conscious and the unconscious. Many philosophers assume that the unconscious is simply the conscious pushed out of view, that the difference between a conscious and an unconscious state is merely that the former is perceptible in a way that the latter is not. This chapter argues that this is inadequate. Conscious and unconscious states have different structures. Conscious states are not simply unconscious ones with awareness superadded; they are different kinds of states and exhibit different structures. For Nietzsche, conscious states are linguistically or conceptually articulated, whereas unconscious states have a form of nonconceptual content.

Keywords:   Nietzsche, conscious, unconscious, awareness, nonconceptual content

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