Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Nietzschean SelfMoral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Paul Katsafanas

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198737100

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198737100.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 24 February 2020

Nietzschean Moral Psychology and its Competitors

Nietzschean Moral Psychology and its Competitors

(p.257) 10 Nietzschean Moral Psychology and its Competitors
The Nietzschean Self

Paul Katsafanas

Oxford University Press

Chapter 10 summarizes the results and returns to the concerns of the Introduction: with the Nietzschean model of agency at hand, the chapter explains how it differs from and improves upon the alternatives offered by Kant, Hume, and Aristotle. It argues that Nietzsche’s account enjoys several advantages over its competitors. First, it is more psychologically realistic, being in conformity with empirical results about human psychology and action. Second, it reveals the ways in which unconscious processes play a signal role in human action. Third, it avoids philosophical problems concerning the locus of agency problem, without committing itself to an exaggerated role for reflective thought. Fourth, and most generally, it frees itself from the often unnoticed moral assumptions that infect so many previous attempts to offer philosophical psychologies.

Keywords:   Nietzsche, philosophical psychology, Kant, Aristotle, Hume, agency

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .