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The Nietzschean SelfMoral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious$
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Paul Katsafanas

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198737100

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198737100.001.0001

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Introduction

Introduction

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 Introduction
Source:
The Nietzschean Self
Author(s):

Paul Katsafanas

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198737100.003.0001

This introductory chapter investigates Nietzsche’s claim that philosophical psychology is the path to the fundamental philosophical problems. Nietzsche aspires to provide an accurate, philosophically sophisticated, and unprejudiced account of human nature; he believes that doing so enables us to address some of the most basic problems in ethics and philosophy of action. The chapter contrasts Nietzsche’s approach to philosophical psychology with more familiar accounts due to Kant, Hume, and Aristotle. It offers a brief overview of the advantages that Nietzschean philosophical psychology enjoys over its competitors. It gives an outline of the book and provides a summary of the following chapters.

Keywords:   philosophical psychology, action, ethics, Nietzsche, Kant, Hume, Aristotle

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