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The Philosophy of Trust$
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Paul Faulkner and Thomas Simpson

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198732549

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.001.0001

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Trust and Collective Agency

Trust and Collective Agency

Chapter:
(p.129) 8 Trust and Collective Agency
Source:
The Philosophy of Trust
Author(s):

Bernd Lahno

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.003.0008

Trust as an emotional attitude includes a participant attitude and a feeling of connectedness to the trusted person by shared aims, values, or norms. Starting from an analysis of collective agency as given by the theory of team reasoning, this chapter argues that such trust is an essential element of what it means to act as part of a collective. In particular, ‘trust in integrity’ is vital for the realization of a complex collective project. It is often encapsulated in routines and based on a normative framework that is produced by the group’s social structure and its institutional background. Forming a collective agent may be associated with the problematic form of ‘categorical trust’ when sharing values and norms degenerates to unconditional and blind submission to the group’s rule.

Keywords:   trust, trustworthiness, coordination, game theory, team reasoning

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