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The Philosophy of Trust$
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Paul Faulkner and Thomas Simpson

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198732549

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.001.0001

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‘But I Was Counting On You!’

‘But I Was Counting On You!’

Chapter:
(p.90) 6 ‘But I Was Counting On You!’
Source:
The Philosophy of Trust
Author(s):

Karen Jones

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.003.0006

This chapter is an exploration of the normative status of the complaint, ‘But I was counting on you!’ This is the signature complaint of those who think that their trust has been betrayed. Thus, by coming to understand when and why the complaint has normative force, we can explore the shape, source, and force of central norms governing trust and trustworthiness. Many moralize those norms and analyse trust as ascribing, or even grounding, an obligation to be trustworthy. Against such moralizing moves, this chapter argues that the norms of trust and trustworthiness are not themselves moral, have the potential to sit uneasily with moral norms, and require external moral regulation. Nevertheless, these norms have genuine normative force, a force that derives from the pressing interest that we have as finite, reflective, and social creatures in being able directly to recruit the agency of another.

Keywords:   trust, trustworthiness, betrayal, normativity, norms

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