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The Philosophy of Trust$
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Paul Faulkner and Thomas Simpson

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198732549

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.001.0001

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On the Risks of Resting Assured

On the Risks of Resting Assured

An Assurance Theory of Trust

Chapter:
(p.51) 4 On the Risks of Resting Assured
Source:
The Philosophy of Trust
Author(s):

Edward S. Hinchman

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.003.0004

Trust manifests a Gricean form of mutual recognition: in inviting trust, the trusted can give the trusting a reason for action or belief grounded, in part, in the trusting’s recognition of the trusted’s intention to give this reason. A trust relation is thus a rational relation, and the basis of this rational norm reflects how the trust can be betrayed, independently of whether it is disappointed. A trust relation can be betrayed without being disappointed, or disappointed without being betrayed, because the reasons made available through trust are grounded not merely in the trusted’s reliability but also in the trusted’s responsiveness to relevant need. This link between trust and rationality reveals how trust is crucially unlike other forms of reliance, whether interpersonal or intrapersonal.

Keywords:   trust, trustworthiness, reasons, rational, betrayal, reliability

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