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The Philosophy of Trust$
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Paul Faulkner and Thomas Simpson

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198732549

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.001.0001

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Trust as a Second-Personal Attitude (of the Heart)

Trust as a Second-Personal Attitude (of the Heart)

Chapter:
(p.35) 3 Trust as a Second-Personal Attitude (of the Heart)
Source:
The Philosophy of Trust
Author(s):

Stephen Darwall

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.003.0003

An important difference between trust and reliance is that trust can be violated, and the very idea of a violation seems to involve some second-personal relationship between truster and trusted. But trust cannot be a deontic second-personal attitude, since these presuppose authority and accountability. Trusting someone to do something involves laying oneself open; one doesn’t have any authority over the trusted and cannot hold them accountable for doing what one trusts them to do. So trust is non-deontic. But it is second-personal in that it is reciprocating: it invites the other to take the same view of the situation and respond in kind. Trust is a second-personal attitude of the heart.

Keywords:   trust, trustworthiness, second-personal, love, authority, reactive attitudes

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