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The Philosophy of Trust$
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Paul Faulkner and Thomas Simpson

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198732549

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.001.0001

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Trusting a Promise and Other Things

Trusting a Promise and Other Things

Chapter:
(p.214) 13 Trusting a Promise and Other Things
Source:
The Philosophy of Trust
Author(s):

David Owens

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732549.003.0013

Many writers assume that trust is a specific psychological attitude, and one of special value to human social life. I argue that there is no specific attitude that constitutes trusting something. Rather, for X to trust Y is for X to engage with Y in a way that will realize the distinctive value of Y. Thus the psychological nature of trust will depend on the nature of the object trusted and the value of trust will depend on the distinctive value of the object trusted. Trust as such has no psychological nature and no distinctive form of value. Taking the example of trust in a promise, this chapter shows how different views about the nature and value of a promise generate different views about what is involved in trusting a promise.

Keywords:   trust, trustworthiness, promise, value, relationships

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