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The Political Economy of European Banking Union$
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David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198727927

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198727927.001.0001

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(p.206) 10 Conclusion
The Political Economy of European Banking Union

David Howarth

Lucia Quaglia

Oxford University Press

This chapter summarizes the main findings of the book: the economic rationale for Banking Union was to address the financial trilemma among financial stability, financial market integration and national regulation, supervision and resolution. This trilemma was made particularly acute by Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and became untenable in the euro area. The timing of Banking Union was determined by the sovereign debt crisis that followed the international financial crisis and which created a doom loop between banks and sovereigns. The design of Banking Union was shaped by three main factors: the configuration of national banking systems, the concern for moral hazard, and the asymmetric bargaining power of the member states. The chapter then points out the contribution of our study to the literature, as well as the recognized limitations of the analysis undertaken, while presenting proposals for further research.

Keywords:   Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), financial trilemma, moral hazard, banking systems, bargaining power, asymmetry, sovereign debt crisis, doom loop

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