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Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 47$
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Brad Inwood

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780198722717

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722717.001.0001

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Non‐Virtuous Intellectual States in Aristotle’s Ethics

Non‐Virtuous Intellectual States in Aristotle’s Ethics

Chapter:
(p.205) Non‐Virtuous Intellectual States in Aristotle’s Ethics
Source:
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 47
Author(s):

Pavlos Kontos

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722717.003.0006

This chapter raises the question of whether Aristotle acknowledges the existence of intellectual, practical (praktikai), and productive (poiētikai) non-virtuous states. It argues that the canvas of practical and productive states — that is, of practical wisdom, craft, and their opposites — is much more nuanced and coherent than it is usually taken to be; that not to make room for non-virtuous practical intellectual states would be detrimental to the intelligibility of Aristotle's concepts of deliberate choice and practical wisdom, and to the tenability of his ethics as a whole; and that the emerging picture of practical intellectual states has far-reaching philosophical consequences for the account of evil and moral change.

Keywords:   Aristotle, ethics, practical wisdom, craft, atechnia, aphrosynē, akolasia, beastliness, evil, moral change

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