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Persons, Animals, Ourselves$
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Paul F. Snowdon

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780198719618

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719618.001.0001

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Some Questions about Animals

Some Questions about Animals

(p.110) 5 Some Questions about Animals
Persons, Animals, Ourselves

Paul F. Snowdon

Oxford University Press

This chapter discusses some general questions about animal existence and persistence, arguing that animals, even advanced ones, do not require psychological properties to remain in existence. An animal also cannot be separated from its body should that body remain alive and intact. These claims imply that if we are animals the same applies to us. It is also argued that life is not a necessary condition for animal existence. This rejection of the Termination Thesis does not, though, seem to have significant implications for the debate about animalism. It is at least plausible to say that an animal cannot itself cease to be an animal, and, moreover, has to remain the type of animal it is, although the support for these claims is not conclusive. Finally, it is argued that animal persistence is not explicable in terms simply of bulk, but is in some sense functional.

Keywords:   persistence conditions, Termination Thesis, life and animal existence, psychological states, animalism, identity

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