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Persons, Animals, Ourselves$
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Paul F. Snowdon

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780198719618

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719618.001.0001

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Strengthening the Rejection of Transplant Arguments

Strengthening the Rejection of Transplant Arguments

(p.217) 11 Strengthening the Rejection of Transplant Arguments
Persons, Animals, Ourselves

Paul F. Snowdon

Oxford University Press

This chapter asks whether there are further reasons for being doubtful about the judgement that the subject or person goes with the brain in brain transplant cases. Some have argued that a case can be made for thinking that intuitions about brain transplants are not reliable, which, if true, would strengthen the response to the transplant argument. This chapter explores two attempts to generate scepticism about these kinds of intuitions—by Kathy Wilkes and Mark Johnston. It is argued that both these attempts, although interesting, are not persuasive. However, there are aspects of the judgement about the brain taking the person which indicate that we are entitled to be sceptical about its soundness. The chapter discusses why, despite this, people tend to have the intuition that the person goes with the brain. It is finally argued that when presented in a slightly different way the idea that minds are being swapped between people in such cases is not outrageous.

Keywords:   brain transplants, animalism, Kathy Wilkes, Mark Johnston, intuitions

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