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Cognition, Content, and the A PrioriA Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge$
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Robert Hanna

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198716297

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716297.001.0001

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Truth in Virtue of Intentionality, Or, The Return of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

Truth in Virtue of Intentionality, Or, The Return of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

Chapter:
(p.146) 4 Truth in Virtue of Intentionality, Or, The Return of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction
Source:
Cognition, Content, and the A Priori
Author(s):

Robert Hanna

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716297.003.0004

What is the analytic-synthetic distinction? According to the contemporary Kantian conception offered in this book, it is the categorically sharp contrast between two fundamentally different kinds of truth, distinguished in terms of what each kind is “true-in-virtue-of.” Chapter 4 tells the thrilling three-part story of how the analytic-synthetic distinction departed from mainstream Analytic philosophy, not with a bang but a whimper, why the analytic-synthetic distinction must now return with a bang, and what that bang must sound like. In so doing, the chapter deploys the earlier accounts of conceptual content and non-conceptual content in order to provide a full explanation and vindication of the analytic-synthetic distinction, including a theory of synthetic a priori truth. This vindication includes an extended critique of Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, and also an explicit argument against the Kripke-Putnam conceptions of the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori.

Keywords:   conceptual content, non-conceptual content, analyticity, syntheticity, synthetic a priori, Quine, Kripke, Putnam, necessary a posteriori, contingent a priori

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