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Explaining the Reasons We ShareExplanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 1$
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Mark Schroeder

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780198713807

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713807.001.0001

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Cudworth and Normative Explanations

Cudworth and Normative Explanations

Chapter:
(p.19) 1 Cudworth and Normative Explanations
Source:
Explaining the Reasons We Share
Author(s):

Mark Schroeder

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713807.003.0002

This chapter argues for the importance of competing theories about moral explanations by showing the role that they play in a familiar and tempting argument against voluntarist ethical theories that is due to Ralph Cudworth. The Standard Model Theory is shown to be incompatible with the possibility of perfectly general explanatory moral theory, and it is argued that the Constitutive Model, which relies on analyses of moral properties and relations, provides a natural and viable alternative. The Standard Model Theory is inconsistent with the reducibility of the moral to the non-moral, but it requires an independent argument against such a reduction.

Keywords:   moral explanation, Ralph Cudworth, Standard Model Theory, Constitutive Model, reduction

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