Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
About OneselfDe Se Thought and Communication$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Manuel García-Carpintero and Stephan Torre

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198713265

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 17 June 2019

Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Epistemology of De Se Thought

Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Epistemology of De Se Thought

Chapter:
(p.25) 2 Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Epistemology of De Se Thought
Source:
About Oneself
Author(s):

Aidan McGlynn

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0002

The aim of this chapter is to maintain that immunity to error through misidentification is a genuine and interesting property of certain de se judgments in the face of problem cases involving the possibility of “quasi-memories”: apparent memories that may derive from someone else’s past. The most promising existing proposals for how to achieve this aim are examined and rejected, and then a novel approach is offered which involves rejecting a presupposition of the debate so far, namely that the modality implicit in the notion of immunity is to be understood as metaphysical impossibility. The alternative proposal is that immunity to error is a robust kind of safety from error, in a sense familiar from recent debates on knowledge. The chapter argues that this allows space for the possibility of quasi-remembering, while acknowledging that immunity to error through misidentification is a significant epistemic property of certain de se thoughts.

Keywords:   immunity to error, misidentification, de se thought, quasi-memory, wh-misidentification, safe belief, justification

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .