The Consciousness Thesis
The Consciousness Thesis
This chapter describes the scientific basis for the claim that consciousness is epiphenomenal, stemming from the work of Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner. It argues that the perceived challenge to responsibility is misplaced: it does not matter whether or not Libet and Wegner are right. The real question turns on the role that information plays in our cognition, not on questions concerning the timing of our conscious states. I then define the thesis to be defended in more detail: that consciousness of the facts that give to our actions their moral significance is a necessary condition of moral responsibility for those acts. It is emphasized that the consciousness at issue is an informational state, not phenomenal consciousness.
Keywords: Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, epiphenomenalism, moral significance, phenomenal consciousness
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