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Moral Error TheoryHistory, Critique, Defence$
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Jonas Olson

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780198701934

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.001.0001

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Debunking Moral Belief

Debunking Moral Belief

Chapter:
(p.139) 7 Debunking Moral Belief
Source:
Moral Error Theory
Author(s):

Jonas Olson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.003.0007

This chapter considers the Moorean argument against moral error theory, i.e. the argument according to which many substantive first-order moral claims are more credible than crucial premises in, and the conclusion of, arguments for moral error theory. It is argued that debunking explanations of moral belief, which have been offered by error theorists like Mackie and Richard Joyce, undermine the force of the Moorean argument.

Keywords:   debunking explanations, Joyce, Mackie, moral belief, Moorean argument

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