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Bayesian RationalityThe probabilistic approach to human reasoning$
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Mike Oaksford and Nick Chater

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780198524496

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524496.001.0001

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Reasoning in the real world: how much deduction is there?

Reasoning in the real world: how much deduction is there?

Chapter:
(p.41) Chapter 3 Reasoning in the real world: how much deduction is there?
Source:
Bayesian Rationality
Author(s):

Mike Oaksford

Nick Chater

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524496.003.0003

The idea that a deductive competence theory is central to human cognition both has a long pedigree and is widely held by many leading figures in the psychology of reasoning. This chapter argues against this tradition in the psychology of reasoning. It claims that almost no everyday human reasoning can be characterized deductively, or has any significant deductive component. Although many theorists have argued that deduction is at the core of cognition, it is argued that it is at the periphery. The chapter begins by clarifying the meaning of the claim that human reasoning involves deduction by introducing Marr’s levels of description of a computational process.

Keywords:   deductive competence theory, human cognition, psychology of reasoning, human reasoning, Marr

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