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Causal CognitionA Multidisciplinary Debate$
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Dan Sperber, David Premack, and Ann James Premack

Print publication date: 1996

Print ISBN-13: 9780198524021

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524021.001.0001

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Intention as psychological cause

Intention as psychological cause

Chapter:
(p.185) 7 Intention as psychological cause
Source:
Causal Cognition
Author(s):

David Premack

Ann James Premack

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524021.003.0007

This chapter presents a domain-specific theory of human social competence according to which humans interpret self-propelled objects that pursue goals as having intentions. These intentional objects engage in interactions to which value is attributed; they reciprocate value, join groups, and take possessions. The theory explains these interactions in terms of the following mental states: perception, desire, and belief.

Keywords:   domain-specific theory, social competence, intentions, intentional objects, perception, desire, belief

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