Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Causal CognitionA Multidisciplinary Debate$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Dan Sperber, David Premack, and Ann James Premack

Print publication date: 1996

Print ISBN-13: 9780198524021

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524021.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 22 November 2019

Distinguishing between animates and inanimates: not by motion alone

Distinguishing between animates and inanimates: not by motion alone

Chapter:
(p.150) 6 Distinguishing between animates and inanimates: not by motion alone
Source:
Causal Cognition
Author(s):

Rochel Gelman

Frank Durgin

Lisa Kaufman

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524021.003.0006

This chapter presents an account of the origins and development of one's ability to classify moveable entities as either animate or inanimate. The account builds on the known abilities of young infants to find three dimensional objects and to reason about some of their fundamental physical characteristics, for example, that they occupy space, move as a whole, or cannot pass through each other. This chapter also shows that motion paths are ambiguous for adults, not just infants. A moving object is perceived as inanimate when its motion path is consistent with Newtonian laws of motion. If the motion path violates Newtonian principles, then animacy is perceived.

Keywords:   animate, inanimate, infants, objects, motion, laws of motion, Newtonian principles

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .