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Causal CognitionA Multidisciplinary Debate$
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Dan Sperber, David Premack, and Ann James Premack

Print publication date: 1996

Print ISBN-13: 9780198524021

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524021.001.0001

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Causality at higher levels

Causality at higher levels

Chapter:
(p.399) 13 Causality at higher levels
Source:
Causal Cognition
Author(s):

Philip Pettit

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524021.003.0013

This chapter analyses various types of causal relationships and argues for the legitimacy of causal claims at higher levels. First, it formulates the physicalist doctrine and discusses the architecture of instrumental control at different levels which this physicalism allows. It also examines how far this architecture of control is mirrored in the architecture of causality: how far causality, like control, can be found at higher levels.

Keywords:   causal relationships, causal claim, physicalist doctrine, physicalism, causality

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