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Hart’s PostscriptEssays on the Postscript to ‘The Concept of Law’$
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Jules L. Coleman

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780198299080

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198299080.001.0001

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Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law A Partial Comparison

Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law A Partial Comparison

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law A Partial Comparison
Source:
Hart’s Postscript
Author(s):

Joseph Raz

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198299080.003.0001

This chapter compares philosophers Herbert Hart and Ronald Dworkin's views on the nature of the theory of law. It aims to explain why Dworkin was wrong to think that Hart and others were concerned with the meaning of the word law and why the semantic sting can either be a good or bad argument in the explanation of the concept of law. It analyses the contents of Hart's The Concept of Law and Dworkin's Law's Empire.

Keywords:   Herbert Hart, Ronald Dworkin, theory of law, semantic sting, The Concept of Law, Law's Empire

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