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Transatlantic Regulatory CooperationLegal Problems and Political Prospects$
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George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen, and Peter L. Lindseth

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780198298922

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198298922.001.0001

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Implementing regulatory cooperation through executive agreements and the problem of democratic accountability

Implementing regulatory cooperation through executive agreements and the problem of democratic accountability

Chapter:
(p.385) Implementing regulatory cooperation through executive agreements and the problem of democratic accountability
Source:
Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation
Author(s):

Joel R. Paul

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198298922.003.0023

This chapter considers a second major structural feature of the American system potentially affected by transatlantic regulatory cooperation: the separation of powers. It focuses on the central role that the US President has historically played in advancing forms of international cooperation via the use of executive agreements, i.e. international compacts signed by the President without the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, as is constitutionally required for treaties. Nearly all trade-related agreements entered into by the United States in fact take the form of executive agreements. This chapter questions the ‘discourse of executive expediency’ that has been used to justify deviation from constitutionally mandated treaty procedures, and concludes that executive agreements, in light of serious questions as to their legal effect, are in fact a poor instrument for implementing regulatory cooperation.

Keywords:   democratic accountability, US President, US politics, regulatory cooperation, executive agreement

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