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Aquinas’s Theory of Natural LawAn Analytic Reconstruction$
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Anthony J. Lisska

Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780198269670

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269670.001.0001

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Beyond the Naturalistic Fallacy: The Rediscovery of Aquinas

Beyond the Naturalistic Fallacy: The Rediscovery of Aquinas

Chapter:
(p.56) 3 Beyond the Naturalistic Fallacy: The Rediscovery of Aquinas
Source:
Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law
Author(s):

Anthony J. Lisska

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269670.003.0003

This chapter aims to undertake an explication of the structural philosophy on moral theory in analytic philosophy with emphasis on Thomas Aquinas' natural law ethic of self-actualization. It discusses David Hume’s arguments on fact/value distinction and analyses G. E. Moore’s use of Hume’s distinction by means of the naturalistic fallacy argument and the intuitionist theory Moore developed in Principia Ethica. This chapter also considers the kinds of questions natural law theory might respond to in working out a consistent ethical naturalism.

Keywords:   moral theory, structural philosophy, Thomas Aquinas, natural law, intuitionist theory, self-actualization, David Hume, G.E. Moore, naturalistic fallacy argument, Principia Ethica

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