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Practical Reason in Law and Morality$
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Neil MacCormick

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780198268772

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198268772.001.0001

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Practical Reason, Law, and State

Practical Reason, Law, and State

Chapter:
(p.193) 11 Practical Reason, Law, and State
Source:
Practical Reason in Law and Morality
Author(s):

Neil MacCormick

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198268772.003.0012

This chapter concludes, not only this book, but writings of pervious books, on ‘Law, State, and Practical Reason’. The philosophical scope of this writing has covered a general theory of law as ‘institutional normative order’, a discussion of sovereignty, statehood, and nationalism, an inquiry into legal reasoning as a discipline involving both logic and rhetoric, and finally in this book a study of practical reasoning in law and morality. The chapter ties up some remaining loose ends that connect the present work with its predecessors. These concern: universal and particular in moral judgement; the place of autonomy in moral reasoning; issues about ‘ natural law’; the virtues of the law-abiding person; the question of how to live; and the problem of life and death.

Keywords:   Kant, moral judgements, moral autonomy, institutional law, moral reasoning, autonomy, natural law

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