Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Autonomy of LawEssays on Legal Positivism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Robert P. George

Print publication date: 1999

Print ISBN-13: 9780198267904

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198267904.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 20 October 2019

Law’s Normative Claims

Law’s Normative Claims

(p.215) 8 Law’s Normative Claims
The Autonomy of Law

Philip Soper

Oxford University Press

People can look at non-conforming behaviour in two ways: either the person is acting immorally or the moral theory that condemns the behaviour is mistaken. To choose the former is to reflect a confidence in the existing moral theory, while choosing the latter is evidence that moral theory for that particular behaviour is wrong. This point says a lot about the link between the descriptive and evaluative enterprises of law. The development of basic moral principles, which draws from moral intuition, is a similar process when it comes to developing social practices, which in turn draw from human behaviour. Legal positivism has contributed much to clarifying the kind of social facts that characterize legal systems, specifically the kind of normative claims that legal systems typically make. Legal positivism provides much of the descriptive front. This chapter is motivated by an interest in reconciling the normative claims of law with the claims that moral philosophers believe can be justified.

Keywords:   evaluative enterprises, moral theory, normative claims, moral philosophy, descriptive enterprises

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .