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The Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law$
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David G. Owen

Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780198265795

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.001.0001

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Intention in Tort Law

Intention in Tort Law

(p.229) Intention in Tort Law
The Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law


Oxford University Press

This chapter indicates how academic writings as widely different as economic analysis of law and the restatement of torts have obscured the reality of intentions, and how that reality is clarified in the judicial development of doctrines as widely different as battery and conspiracy to injure in trade and labor relations. Intention is a tough, sophisticated, and serviceable concept. Included in one’s intention is everything which is part of one’s plan (proposal), whether as purpose or as way of effecting one’s purpose(s): everything which is part of one’s reason for behaving as one does. In reading the words ‘plan’, ‘proposal’, ‘deliberation’, and ‘choice’, one should ignore all connotations of formality and ‘deliberateness’; in the relevant sense there is a plan or proposal wherever there is trying, or doing (or refraining from doing) something in order to bring about something or as a way of accomplishing something.

Keywords:   law, restatement, torts, intention, plan, proposal, deliberation, choice, battery, conspiracy

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