Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Criminal Attempts$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

R. A. Duff

Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780198262688

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198262688.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 21 October 2019

Action, Basic Action, and the ‘Act Requirement’

Action, Basic Action, and the ‘Act Requirement’

(p.239) 9 Action, Basic Action, and the ‘Act Requirement’
Criminal Attempts

R. A. Duff

Oxford University Press

This chapter examines the role of action and act requirement in determining liability in criminal attempts. It discusses some popular accounts of action to which subjectivists sometimes appeal and explains the bases for an objectivist account of the law of attempts concerning action. It explains that philosophers and legal theorists define action not just in terms of bodily movements, but also in terms of bodily movements plus some further feature which identifies those movements to be the results of transitive rather than merely intransitive actions.

Keywords:   action, criminal liability, criminal attempt, act requirement, subjectivism, objectivism, bodily movements

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .