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Criminal Attempts$
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R. A. Duff

Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780198262688

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198262688.001.0001

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Objectivist Themes and Variations

Objectivist Themes and Variations

(p.193) 8 Objectivist Themes and Variations
Criminal Attempts

R. A. Duff

Oxford University Press

This chapter examines the objectivist argument for liability in criminal attempts. Objectivism does not appeal to any comparable fully objective principle. Objectivists do not claim that liability should be determined purely by the objective aspects of the agent's action. Though they agree that criminal liability should be determined in a crucial part by the subjective dimensions of the agent's action, they deny that the the subjective aspects should be sole ground of liability.

Keywords:   criminal liability, criminal attempt, objectivism, subjectivism, criminal law

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