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Criminal Attempts$
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R. A. Duff

Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780198262688

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198262688.001.0001

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Subjectivism II: Character and Action

Subjectivism II: Character and Action

(p.173) 7 Subjectivism II: Character and Action
Criminal Attempts

R. A. Duff

Oxford University Press

This chapter examines a subjectivist argument that liability in criminal attempts should be determined by character rather than choice. A character conception expresses a significant truth about who can be held criminally liable. This argument suggests that only moral agents whose actions exhibit the structure of thought, attitude, and motivation should he held liable. This chapter compares that character argument with its choice counterpart, and the subjective with the objective argument.

Keywords:   character, criminal attempts, criminal liability, subjectivism, attitude, motivation, criminal law

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