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Criminal Attempts$
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R. A. Duff

Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780198262688

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198262688.001.0001

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Subjectivism I: Culpability and Choice

Subjectivism I: Culpability and Choice

Chapter:
(p.147) 6 Subjectivism I: Culpability and Choice
Source:
Criminal Attempts
Author(s):

R. A. Duff

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198262688.003.0006

This chapter examines a subjectivist argument that liability in criminal attempts should be determined by choice. It explains the importance of choice on the grounds that a system of criminal law which makes liability depend on choice respects individual freedom and maximises citizens' control over their own lives. It argues that the subjectivist conception of choice as the key determinant of criminal liability has some radical implications for the law of attempts.

Keywords:   choice, criminal attempts, criminal liability, freedom, subjectivism, criminal law

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