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Criminal Attempts$
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R. A. Duff

Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780198262688

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198262688.001.0001

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Chance, Control, and Culpability

Chance, Control, and Culpability

(p.327) 12 Chance, Control, and Culpability
Criminal Attempts

R. A. Duff

Oxford University Press

This chapter examines the issue of luck and culpability in relation to the subjectivist argument that liability in criminal attempts should be determined by choice. It analyses subjectivist distinctions between control, luck, and chance, and discusses the argument that actual outcomes of actions are always a matter of luck or chance. It suggests that the mere fact than an action's outcome was partly a matter of luck is usually not taken to preclude crediting or discrediting the agent that caused the outcome.

Keywords:   luck, culpability, criminal liability, criminal attempts, choice, control, chance

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