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Criminal Attempts$
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R. A. Duff

Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780198262688

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198262688.001.0001

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Action, Intention, and Responsibility

Action, Intention, and Responsibility

(p.293) 11 Action, Intention, and Responsibility
Criminal Attempts

R. A. Duff

Oxford University Press

This chapter discusses a different account of action related to the determination of liability in criminal attempts that rejects the objectivist and subjectivist accounts and some of their assumptions. This account involves intention, action, and responsibility and disagrees with the reductivist definition of action. This chapter explains the relevant concepts of voluntary and involuntary actions, the act requirement, the action principle, non-intended agency, and intentions and reasons.

Keywords:   action, criminal liability, criminal attempts, objectivism, subjectivism, reductivism, action principle, act requirement

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