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General Theory of Norms$
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Hans Kelsen

Print publication date: 1991

Print ISBN-13: 9780198252177

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.001.0001

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Is and Ought in Kant's Philosophy

Is and Ought in Kant's Philosophy

Chapter:
(p.79) 18 Is and Ought in Kant's Philosophy
Source:
General Theory of Norms
Author(s):

Hans Kelsen

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0018

No duality of Is and Ought can be found in Kant's philosophy for the very simple reason that, for Kant, the moral norm (the moral Ought, the moral law) emanates from reason in its function as practical reason, the very same reason whose function it is to know what is. For Kant says explicitly in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals that practical reason, the moral legislator, is fundamentally the same as theoretical reason: ‘I require of a critical examination of a pure practical reason, if it is to be complete, that its unity with the speculative be subject to presentation under a common principle, because in the final analysis there can be but one and the same reason which must be differentiated only in application’.

Keywords:   Is, Ought, duality, Kant, moral norms, practical reason, human behaviour

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