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The Ontology of MindEvents, Processes, and States$
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Helen Steward

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250647

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250647.001.0001

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States and the Type-Token Distinction

States and the Type-Token Distinction

Chapter:
(p.104) (p.105) 4 States and the Type-Token Distinction
Source:
The Ontology of Mind
Author(s):

Helen Steward

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250647.003.0005

This chapter attempts to explain how we come by the nouns and nominal phrases which suggest reference to states, before going on to argue that the idea that events and states are close relations in the same ontological family — an idea present either explicitly or implicitly in the writings of many philosophers — has been a huge and serious mistake. It suggests, in particular, that the concept of a token state has been widely misunderstood and that the sorts of stative nominals which are sometimes alleged to refer to these entities are usually best understood as nominalizations of whole sentences, and as expressions, therefore, which refer to facts rather than to particulars.

Keywords:   states, properties, philosophy of mind, stative nominal, normalization

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